What You Always Wanted to Know About Model Checking of Fault-Tolerant Distributed Algorithms by Konnov, Igor et al.
What You Always Wanted to Know about
Model Checking of Fault-Tolerant
Distributed Algorithms?
Igor Konnov, Helmut Veith, and Josef Widder
TU Wien (Vienna University of Technology)
Abstract. Distributed algorithms have numerous mission-critical ap-
plications in embedded avionic and automotive systems, cloud comput-
ing, computer networks, hardware design, and the internet of things.
Although distributed algorithms exhibit complex interactions with their
computing environment and are difficult to understand for human engi-
neers, computer science has developed only very limited tool support to
catch logical errors in distributed algorithms at design time.
In the last two decades we have witnessed a revolutionary progress in
software model checking due to the development of powerful techniques
such as abstract model checking, SMT solving, and partial order reduc-
tion. Still, model checking of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms poses
multiple research challenges, most notably parameterized verification:
verifying an algorithm for all system sizes and different combinations of
faults. In this paper, we survey our recent results in this area which ex-
tend and combine abstraction, partial orders, and bounded model check-
ing. Our results demonstrate that model checking has acquired sufficient
critical mass to build the theory and the practical tools for the formal
verification of large classes of distributed algorithms.
1 Introduction
Fault-tolerant distributed algorithms (FTDA) are a central research area in dis-
tributed computing theory [28,2]. While such algorithms typically have been
used in safety critical applications in the automotive or avionic industries, new
application domains such as cloud computing provide additional motivation to
study fault-tolerant algorithms: with the huge number of computers involved in a
cloud, faults are the norm [30] rather than an exception. Together, this motivates
our research on automated verification techniques for fault-tolerant distributed
algorithms. We need to automatically verify such mechanisms for several hun-
dreds or even thousands of components. However, a straightforward application
of model checking to systems of such a scale suffers from combinatorial state
space explosion.
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A paradigmatic approach to verify very large systems is parameterized model
checking : if M(n) is a distributed or concurrent system consisting of n identical
components, and φ is a temporal logic formula, parameterized model checking
requires us to check whether ∀n.M(n) |= φ. Already for quite restricted classes
of concurrent systems the problem is undecidable, cf. our recent survey [4]. For
fault-tolerant distributed algorithms there are (at least) two more challenges that
we shall discuss below: (i) multiple parameters with arithmetic constraints and
(ii) parameterized code. Let us describe these challenges more precisely. First, in
addition to n there is a parameter t that expresses the assumed number of faulty
components, and algorithms are typically correct only under a resilience condi-
tion. A typical resilience condition in the case of Byzantine fault tolerance [31,14]
is n > 3t. Second, while the parameterized model checking problems discussed
in [4] assume that the process code and state space are independent of the pa-
rameters, FTDAs often count messages: Due to faults, processes cannot wait
for messages from specific (possibly faulty) senders. Therefore, most FTDAs use
counters, e.g., if a process receives a certain message from more than t distinct
senders, then it concludes that one of the senders must be non-faulty. We call
such conditions on counters threshold guards.
Algorithm 1 Core logic of the broad-
casting algorithm from [35].
Code for processes i if it is correct:
Variables
1: vi ∈ {false,true}
2: accepti ∈ {false,true} ← false
Rules
3: if vi and not sent 〈echo〉 before then
4: send 〈echo〉 to all;
5: if received 〈echo〉
from at least t+1 distinct processes
and not sent 〈echo〉 before then
6: send 〈echo〉 to all;
7: if received 〈echo〉 from at least n− t
distinct processes then
8: accepti ← true;
qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
sv 6= V1∧
nsnt0 =
nsnt ∧
sv0 = sv
nsnt0 = nsnt + 1
sv0 = SE
q5
q6
q7
q8
q9
qF
rcvd ≤ rcvd ′ ∧ rcvd ′ ≤ nsnt + f
(t+ 1 > rcvd ′)∧
sv ′ = sv0 ∧
nsnt ′ = nsnt0
t+ 1 ≤ rcvd ′
sv0 = V0
sv0 6= V0∧
nsnt ′ = nsnt0
nsnt ′ = nsnt0 + 1
n− t > rcvd ′
n− t ≤ rcvd ′
sv ′ = SE
sv ′ = AC
Fig. 1. A control flow automaton of the
Algorithm 1 for Byzantine faults.
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Algorithm 1 presents a threshold-based FTDA in pseudo code, as is typi-
cal for the distributed algorithms literature. It uses threshold guards in lines 5
and 7. In Figure 1, we give a graphical representation of a control-flow automa-
ton that serves as a formal representation of the algorithm. For instance, the
local variable rcvd represents the number of received messages, which is implic-
itly assumed in the pseudo code, while the global variable nsnt represents the
number of messages sent by the correct processes. Moreover, the local variable sv
represents the local control state of a process, which is implicit in the pseudo
code in the phrases “not sent 〈echo〉 before” and “accept i ← TRUE”. Note that
the expressions over the parameters are compared to the value of variable rcvd ′,
which contains the number of received messages, including the messages received
at the current step. A system is then composed of n−f instances of the control-
flow automaton that run concurrently and represent the correct processes. The
formal definition and the semantics of control-flow automata can be found in [21].
We observe that the process code and state space depend on the parame-
ters (in our example on n and t). In addition to the parameterized number of
processes and faults, automatic verification of FTDAs has to deal with process
code which refers to parameters in a non-trivial way. We address this problem
by stacking different techniques that we will survey in the following section.
2 Verification techniques
Figure 2 gives an overview of our techniques that we introduced in a series of
papers on parametrized model checking of FTDAs [21,23,24]. In Section 3, we
discuss how these techniques interact with each other in the framework of our tool
ByMC. We deal with the parametrized code and state space by a parametrized
interval data abstraction [21] in Section 2.1. After that step, we have obtained
a more classic parametrized model checking problem where all processes are
uniform [4] and the system is thus symmetric. Symmetry allows us to change
representation into a counter representation (Section 2.2) which gives rise to
different techniques, namely, counter abstraction (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), and
oﬄine partial order reduction with acceleration (Sections 2.5 to 2.7).
2.1 Parametric Interval Data Abstraction (PIA data)
In [21] we formalized threshold-guarded statements (e.g., the one from line 5 in
the pseudocode example given in Algorithm 1) using a special form of control
flow automata, e.g.:
q4 q5t+ 1 ≤ rcvd ′
The above edge from q4 to q5 can be executed only if the number of received
messages rcvd ′ is greater than or equal to t + 1. The central insight is that for
evaluating this condition, the precise value of rcvd ′ is not important, it suffices
to know whether rcvd ′ is above the threshold. Our case study in [21] contained
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Fig. 2. Stacks of techniques
an additional threshold guard of n−t. This motivated an abstract domain of four
intervals I0 = [0, 1[ and I1 = [1, t+ 1[ and I2 = [t+ 1, n− t[ and I3 = [n− t, n].
In our approach, the abstract domain is extracted from the guards automatically.
Recall that we want to get rid of parameterized process code. To this end, we
can now replace the guards that refer to unbounded variables and parameters by
their abstraction. In our abstract domain, if the guard “t+ 1 ≤ rcvd ′” evaluates
to true, this means that rcvd ′ is in the interval [t+ 1, n− t[ or [n− t, n]. These
intervals correspond to the abstract values I2 and I3, respectively. Thus, we can
replace the guard by:
q4 q5rcvd ′ = I2 ∨ rcvd ′ = I3
In this way we obtain a finite-state abstract process. Still, the resulting system
is a parallel composition of a parametric number of such processes.
2.2 Counter Representation
A system that consists of concurrent anonymous (identical) processes can be
modeled as a counter system by exploiting the symmetry of the system: Instead
of recording which process is in which local state, we record for each local state,
how many processes are in this state. Thus, we need one counter per local state `,
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Fig. 3. An illustration of a counter representation for a system with n = 7, t = 1, f = 1.
States s3 and s
′
3 correspond to the single abstract state sˆ3 in Figure 4.
which we denote by κ[`]. After the PIA data abstraction, abstract processes have
a fixed finite number of local states, hence we have a fixed number of counters.
A step by a process that goes from local state ` to local state `′ is modeled by
decrementing κ[`] and incrementing κ[`′]. When we fix the number of processes,
e.g., by giving a concrete value to n, each counter is bounded by the number of
processes n.
Figure 3 illustrates a transition system obtained by switching to a counter
representation of a system of six correct processes (hence, the sum of counters is
six in each state). Note that each transition decrements one counter and incre-
ments another one. As one can see, if the original system does not have self-loops,
the counter representation does not have them either. This is in sharp contrast
to counter abstraction, which is presented in Section 2.3.
However, as we are interested in the parametrized problem, we have to con-
sider systems for all values of n. That is, after changing the representation,
we have not reached a finite state representation. Thus another abstraction is
needed.
Remark. In the literature, “counter representation” is sometimes referred to
as “counter abstraction,” partly because such a system can be viewed as more
abstract due to absence of process identifiers. As the specifications of FTDAs
do not single out processes but refer to process states only using quantification
over the individual processes, for us this “counter representation” maintains all
information which is present in the parallel composition of processes. Thus, in
our setting, the counter representation is precise for the specifications of FTDAs
that quantify over all correct processes.
2.3 Parametric Interval Counter Abstraction (PIA counter)
In the counter representation of Section 2.2, the unbounded counter values are
the only source of an unbounded state space. To get rid of this, the natural idea
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Fig. 4. A small part of the transition system obtained by counter abstraction of counter
representations for all parameters.
is to replace integer counters by counters over a finite abstract domain. In our
work, we use the same domain as in the PIA data abstraction in Section 2.1, e.g.,
for Algorithm 1, we use the domain of four intervals I0 = [0, 1[ and I1 = [1, t+ 1[
and I2 = [t+ 1, n− t[ and I3 = [n− t;n]. Figure 4 illustrates counter abstraction
of counter representations for all parameter values. For instance, the abstract
states sˆ0, sˆ1, sˆ3, sˆ4 represent the concrete states s0, s1, s3, s
′
3, s4 from Figure 3.
The abstract state sˆ2 represents states that do not appear for the parameter
values in Figure 3, but occur, e.g., for n = 4, t = 1, f = 1.
For decrementing and incrementing counters, a counter abstraction intro-
duces abstract operations. For instance, an increment of abstract value I1 should
overapproximate that a concrete value from the interval [1, t+ 1[ is incremented.
Note that increment can result in the same interval I1 or in the next interval I2.
Similarly, decrement either maintains or changes its abstract value. When decre-
ment and increment maintain the counter values, the abstract transitions form
self-loops, as one can see in Figure 4. Hence, abstract increment is not determin-
istic. In particular, applying an abstract increment to a counter does not have to
change the counter value ever, which introduces spurious behavior, i.e., abstract
paths that do not correspond to real paths.
Our PIA counter abstraction uses many ideas developed by Pnueli et al. [32].
Regarding the abstract domain, they focused on mutual exclusion and thus used
the well-known “(0, 1,more)” abstract domain, whereas we focus on FTDAs and
use intervals with parametric boundaries.
In this way, we arrive at a system of a fixed number of counters that range
over a finite domain, that is, a finite-state model checking problem. We have
used this in [21] (cf. [16] for technical details) to check safety and liveness of
classic fault-tolerant broadcasting algorithms under a number of fault models.
As in [32], abstraction makes liveness verification more challenging as it requires
to add justice constraints. Moreover, for liveness we had to deal with spurious
counterexamples, cf. Section 2.4.
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Fig. 5. Spurious loop due to to coarse abstraction in classic CEGAR [10] on the left,
and a spurious path due to many concrete systems that are mapped to one abstract
systems in parametrized model checking on the right.
2.4 Parametrized Abstraction Refinement
Our PIA abstraction maintains the relevant properties of threshold guards and
counters, so that the classic CEGAR approach [10], which consists of refining
the state space, is not suitable. However, the non-determinism due to abstract
operations on counters leads to spurious transitions that lead to spurious coun-
terexamples. Hence our abstraction refinement approach deals with removing
transitions.
Our main problem stems from the non-determinism due to abstract counters.
If a process moves from local state ` to `′ we have to decrease the counter κ(`)
and increase κ(`′). However, abstract decrease may lead to a smaller abstract
value, while abstract increase maintains the counter value. Overall, processes
may be lost. As we use global variables to record the number of message sent,
we have the same effect there and messages “may be lost” due to abstraction.
As messages may be required to make progress, this generates challenges for the
verification of liveness properties.
Our current approach is to use an SMT solver to check whether abstract
transitions correspond to concrete ones. If this is not the case, we explicitly
remove these transitions from the transition relation of the counter abstraction.
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See [16] for implementation details, where we also discuss how we refine unfair
loops that occur in some case studies.
We would like to mention that abstraction refinement in parametrized model
checking generates challenges different from classic CEGAR. As shown in Fig-
ure 5, abstract transitions that build a path in the abstract system may stem
from different concrete systems for different parameter values. Currently, we deal
with such counterexamples by user-provided invariant candidates that our tool
checks to be invariants and which are then used for verification. To achieve more
automation, one has to detect spurious paths instead of individual spurious tran-
sitions. However, this is challenging in the parameterized case, as infinitely many
concrete systems are involved.
2.5 Threshold Automata
In Sections 2.1–2.4, we used control-flow automata (CFA) as an input to our
model checking techniques (cf. Figure 1). A CFA is a formal presentation that is
close to pseudo code and symbolically captures the transition relation of a single
process as a formula over input, output (primed), and temporary variables. A
path through the control-flow automaton (non-deterministically) computes a
single transition in the transition relation of the algorithm. For instance, the
leftmost path of the CFA shown in Figure 1 computes the local transition from
the local state with the assignment sv 7→ V0, rcvd 7→ 0, and nsnt 7→ 0 to
the local state with the assignment sv 7→ V0, rcvd 7→ f , and nsnt 7→ 0 (once
the target state of the transition is computed, the primes are dropped). If we
apply data abstraction (see Section 2.1) to the local variables, we obtain an
abstract control-flow automaton. Likewise, a path through the abstract control-
flow automaton computes a single transition in the abstract transition relation.
There is, however, an important difference between the input CFA and the CFA
that is created by data abstraction: the domain of the local variables, e.g., rcvd ,
in the abstract CFA is finite, and hence the local state space of each process is
finite. This observation allows us to use another representation of the abstract
transition relation, which we call a threshold automaton [23].
In a nutshell, a threshold automaton is a graph, whose nodes correspond
to the abstract local states of a process, and the edges correspond to the local
transitions. The edges are annotated with linear arithmetic constraints over the
parameters and the shared variables, e.g., nsnt ≥ (n− t)− f , as well as with in-
crements of the shared variables, e.g., nsnt ′ = nsnt+1. Note the three important
differences of a threshold automaton from a CFA:
1. The nodes of a threshold automaton correspond to the local states, whereas
the nodes of a CFA correspond to the locations in the control flow of the
code computing the next state of the algorithm;
2. An atomic step of the algorithm is represented by an edge of a threshold
automaton, as opposite to a path of a CFA;
3. The edges of a threshold automaton are annotated only with shared variables
and parameters, whereas the values of the local variables are implicit in the
automata nodes.
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Fig. 6. A threshold automaton for the CFA shown in Figure 1. The nodes correspond to
the local states of the processes, while the edges correspond to the guarded transitions.
The edges are annotated with guards as follows: the bold gray edge is guarded with
true; the dotted edges are guarded with nsnt ≥ 1− f ; the solid edges are guarded with
nsnt ≥ (t+ 1)− f ; the dashed edges are guarded with nsnt ≥ (n− t)− f . Finally, nsnt
is incremented by the edges from the local states 00, 10, and 01 to the local states 12,
22, and 33, whereas all other edges do not change nsnt .
Figure 6 illustrates a threshold automaton that is constructed automatically
from the CFA shown in Figure 1 by our tool. For instance, if a process is in local
state 00 and nsnt ≥ (n− t)− f , then the process may go to the local state 22.
In doing so, it increases nsnt .
In our case studies, all increments of shared variables in threshold automata
are outside of loops. This is a consequence of the class of FTDAs under consider-
ation: each correct process sends a message of each type at most once, and thus
increases each shared variable at most once. The partial order reduction tech-
niques in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 exploit this property to guarantee completeness
of bounded model checking.
2.6 Checking Reachability by Bounded Model Checking using
Oﬄine Partial Order Reduction and Acceleration
In [23], we apply SAT-based bounded model checking to verify reachability prop-
erties of the finite model obtained by counter abstraction of FTDAs (see Sec-
tion 2.3). It is well-known that to make bounded model checking complete for
reachability properties, one has to analyze executions of length up to the diam-
eter of the transition system [3].
To this end, we first compute an upper bound on the diameter of the counter
representation, that is, an upper bound on the minimal number of steps required
to reach any configuration σ′ from a configuration σ. From the bound on the
counter representation we obtain a diameter bound on the counter abstraction.
In the following we discuss why, surprisingly, the diameter is bounded.
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Fig. 7. A counter system in Figure 3 extended with accelerated transitions (dashed)
Assume σ′ is reached from σ by steps of two processes where each process
transitions from local state ` to local state `′. In classic interleaving semantics,
this run has length 2. However, we might also model this as a single update
on the counters, that is we may decrease the counter κ(`) and increase κ(`′)
by two, respectively. This idea is illustrated in Figure 7. In general, we may
move arbitrarily many process at once, and call such runs of counter systems
accelerated. In this example, 2 would be the acceleration factor. In the context
of parametrized model checking, the important property is that because we may
move arbitrarily many process at a time, there is potential to bound the diameter
independently of the value of the parameters!
Exploiting commutativity arguments not given in detail here, by swapping
two neighboring transitions in a run, we obtain the same final state. To combine
this with acceleration, one would like to swap transitions in such a way that
many neighboring transitions can be accelerated. Importantly, one has to ensure
that after swapping the guard of a transition still evaluates to true. Ensuring
this has great influence on the actual bound and is the key technical argument
from [23], where we also show that the resulting bounds are sufficiently small to
check several case studies. Note that our method can be seen as a form of partial
order reduction that is applied before model checking, i.e., an oﬄine partial order
reduction.
2.7 Bounded Model Checking using SMT
Our final method avoids counter abstraction and directly encodes runs of the
counter representation in SMT. A global system state, which contains basically
one counter per local state, can be represented as a vector of integer variables
(one for each local state). As in SAT-based bounded model checking, one can
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then encode the transition relation, and the subsequent global state using a fresh
vector of integer variables (or fresh integer variables for the counters that have
actually been updated).
While the technique of Section 2.6 conceptually enumerates all runs of length
up to the diameter, in [24] we only encode a small set of “schemas”, and show that
the (representative) runs generated from the schemas span the reachable state
space. A schema is essentially a sequence of scheduling constraints containing
guards. The schemas are obtained by an improvement of the partial order ideas
that we used in [23] to bound the diameter. Thus, we obtain a more aggressive
oﬄine partial order reduction, and significantly better experimental results that
are discussed in Section 4.
To illustrate schemas, consider the threshold automaton depicted in Figure 6.
The automaton has three guards: ϕ1 ≡ nsnt ≥ 1 − f , ϕ2 ≡ nsnt ≥ t + 1 − f ,
and ϕ3 ≡ nsnt ≥ n − t − f . Consider the following transitions of the threshold
automaton: the transition r1 from 01 to 02; the transition r2 from 02 to 22,
the transition r3 from 22 to 33. Then, a schema {}r1{ϕ1, ϕ2}r1r2r3{ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3}
generates runs for various parameter values, where the transition r1 is executed
by several processes first and makes the guards ϕ1 and ϕ2 true; after that the
transitions r1, r2, and r3 are executed by several processes one after the other
and make the guard ϕ3 true.
The number of different threshold guards in the typical distributed algo-
rithms in the literature varies from one to ten, which results in a reasonably
large number of schemas that have to be checked, typically several thousand
schemas [24]. Note that the schemas can be verified independently, and thus, in
parallel.
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3 Implementation: Byzantine Model Checker
We have implemented the techniques described in Section 2 in our tool ByMC:
Byzantine Model Checker1. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate two different workflows
that combine our techniques within ByMC.
In the first workflow depicted in Figure 8, our tool computes data and counter
abstractions and invokes a model checker to verify a finite-state abstract system.
Depending on the choice of the model checker, ByMC can verify either safety
properties, or both safety and liveness: the explicit-state model checker Spin [18]
or the BDD-based symbolic algorithms in NuSMV/nuXmv [7] allow us to verify
safety and liveness as described in [21]; the SAT-based bounded model checker
implemented in NuSMV/nuXmv allows us to verify safety properties2 as de-
scribed in [23]. When a model checker reports a counterexample, ByMC checks
whether the counterexample is spurious, and when it finds spurious behavior,
ByMC refines the counter abstraction.
In the second workflow depicted in Figure 9, our tool computes only data
abstraction (Section 2.1), constructs a threshold automaton (Section 2.5) and
computes a complete set of schemas (Section 2.7) as described in [24]. Each
schema is encoded as an SMT formula in linear integer arithmetic and checked
with an SMT solver, e.g., Z3 [11] or MathSAT [9]. As this technique maintains
precise process counters, it does not produce spurious counterexamples that are
caused by counter abstraction in the first workflow. Thus, the refinement loop
is not required in our experiments.
4 Evaluation and Case Studies
In Figures 10 and 11 we show how our techniques allowed us to check more and
more involved distributed algorithms.
1 http://forsyte.at/software/bymc/
2 Although NuSMV implements bounded model checking for LTL, our present results
guarantee completeness only for safety properties.
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Fig. 10. Time to verify instances of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms
We are currently able to verify FTDAs that use threshold guards and work
in asynchronous systems:
Broadcast. Reliable broadcast is a problem that can be solved in asynchronous
systems, and we have verified the core of several such algorithms: Folklore
reliable broadcast (“first forward to all then accept”, e.g., given in [8]), Con-
sistent Broadcast [35], Asynchronous Byzantine agreement [5]. Also the prob-
lem called “Condition-based consensus” can be solved in asynchronous sys-
tems and bears some similarities to broadcasting. We verified the condition-
based consensus algorithm from [29]. After we published our verification
results, a broadcasting algorithm very similar to [35] but with a different
threshold was published in [19], and our tool easily checked its correctness.
FTDAs using failure detectors. The impossibility of solving non-blocking
atomic commitment in asynchronous systems can be circumvented by using
oracular mechanisms like failure detectors. They can be easily encoded in
linear temporal logic. Thus, we verified such atomic commitment algorithms
from [33,17].
Fast consensus algorithms. The idea of this class of algorithms is to have a
quick (cheap) distributed preprocessing to a more expensive consensus algo-
rithm: the algorithm terminates quickly in average runs, e.g., if there are no
faults, if the system is not “too asynchronous”, or if all processes have the
same initial value. In case the preprocessing does not lead to a conclusive
result, a “more-expensive” fall-back consensus algorithm is started with spe-
cific initial values. Our tool can check the correctness of this preprocessing
of the algorithms BOSCO [34], C1CS [6], and CF1S [12].
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Fig. 11. Memory to verify instances of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms
Our techniques are currently limited to the class of asynchronous FTDAs
that use only threshold guards. In particular, as consensus cannot be solved in
asynchronous systems [15], we cannot completely verify algorithms for consensus,
atomic broadcast, state machine replication, non-blocking atomic commitment,
and similar hard problems. For that we need to restrict the interleavings and
move from asynchronous systems to partially synchronous systems [14]. Only
then, famous FTDAs like in [14] or Paxos [25] can be verified automatically in
their entirety.
Our tool uses an extension of Promela as a front-end for CFA [22,16]. Their
source code and the code of the threshold automata are freely available.3
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Automatic verification of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms is a challenging
task. To the best of our knowledge, besides our own work, there are only few
papers that deal with parameterized verification of FTDAs [1,13]. The main
complications stem from multiple parameters, that are related by resilience con-
ditions, as well as the fact that not only the number of processes, but also the
code of each process is parameterized.
To make progress in automatic verification, our first steps have focused on
domain-specific abstractions for a large class of fault-tolerant distributed al-
gorithms with threshold guards. These guards are quite natural constructs in
the distributed algorithms literature: for instance, majority voting on a value
3 https://github.com/konnov/fault-tolerant-benchmarks/
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is a natural technique to achieve agreement. The algorithms we address with
our technique operate in the standard interleaving semantics (with fairness con-
straints). In terms of distributed algorithms literature, they are asynchronous. In
the future, we will address also other computational models such as completely
synchronous, partially synchronous, timed systems, and round-based systems.
Further, we want to develop more domain-specific techniques for increas-
ingly larger classes of FTDAs. We are currently developing a tool4 that im-
plements these techniques and applies them to the popular TLA+ specification
language [27]. This will give us a framework and a toolset for verification of
complex distributed algorithms such as Paxos [26].
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